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has no claim for a Federal court to plied. I. the jurisdiction of the
protect his rights or redress his eourt grows out of the subject mat-
wrongs touching that contract. If ter of litigation, it should be dealt
we are ever to be relieved from the with as if there were no such thing
uncertainties which attend the ad- as State courts. If the case does
ministration of justice in non-Fed- not belong to this class, it should be
eral cases in the Federal courts, it dealt with as if there were no Fed-
will be by the adoption of one sim- eral courts.
ple test, easily understood and ap- HoMER C. MgcEcnE.
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Doles v. Powell involved another phase of the Legal Holiday question in
Pennsylvania. The case was decided, November 24, I89o , upon this
opinion of ARCHBALD, P. J. (reprinted in full from the Lackawanna
Jurist, pp. 429-31): " By the rule of reference entered by the plaintiff,
the choosing of arbitrators was fixed for the thirtieth day of May last.
This was Decoration day,and therefore, according to the statute, a holiday.
The defendant did not attend and arbitrators were chosen in his absence.
The question is whether this was valid. It is a mistake to suppose that
the day termed Decoration day is merely a holiday with respect to paper
due. or presentable at banks. Whatever may be the effect in this regard
of the statutes creating the other legal holidays which we have, the act
relating to Decoration day is not so limited (Act 28 May, 1874, P. L. 222.)
The act is short and I will quote it. [See 29 AMERICAN LAw REGISTER
179.] It will be seen from this that the provision relating to bank-
paper is distinct from and subsequent to that section of the statute
which establishes the day as a holiday. This therefore cannot be regarded
as the controlling purpose of the day; it is merely a legal incident of it,
and for the greater certainty finds its way into the statute. The day having
been created a holiday, must be given all the incidents of such a day, and
among these we recognize the right to be free from the obligation of ordi-
nary compulsory legal process. (See an able and exhaustive article on
this subject in Amer. Law Regster, vol. XXIX, I37-19o). If such be the
case, the defendant here was not bound to attend and choose arbitrators
upon the day fixed by rule, nor could a lawful choice be made in his
absence. The prothonotary had a right to close his office upon that day,
and it was to be presumed that he would take advantage of this privilege.
The fixing of the day was the act of the plaintiff, and not of the pro-
thonotary, and there was nothing therefore to indicate to the defendant
that the office would not be closed. He was not bound for this reason, if
for no other, to attend and see whether the office would be open or not.
The rule of reference was compulsory, and it was rendered uncertain in
its effect by the fact that the day fixed for choosing arbitrators was a
holiday, the plaintiff has only himself to blame for it. The choice of
arbitrators being invalid, all the subsequent proceedings must fall with it.
The rule of reference is set aside, and the award of arbitrators vacated."
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Manchester v. Mlassachusetls decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States, March 16, 1891, has a political interest, from one of its
resolutions being that every nation has a territorial jurisdiction over tide
waters adjacent to its coasts of not less than a marine league. Justice
BLATCHFORD added, in writing the opinion of the Court, that "The open
sea within this limit, is, of course, subject to the common right of navi-
gation; and all governments, for the purpose of self-protection in time of
war, or for the prevention of frauds on its revenue, exercise an authority
beyond this limit," citing Gould on Waters, pt. I, ch. i, H 1-17, and
notes; Neill v. Duke of Devonshire (1882), L. R. 8 App. Cas. 135; Gam-
mell v. Commissioners (1859), 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 419; M11owat v. fcFee
(i88o), 5 Can. Sup. Ct. 66;. Queen v. Cubilt (1889), L. R. 22 Q. B. Div.
622; Stat. 46 and 47 Vict. ch. 22; Direct U. S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-A mer.
Tel. Co. (1877), L. R. 2 App. Cas. 394. The case irose from a complaint
against the officers and crew of a menhaden steamer for seining in Buz-
zard's Bay, contrary to the Massachusetts Statute of 1886, ch. x, i. The
steamer had been duly licensed by the United States, and immunity was
claimed, upon the principle that fishing upon the high seas was a part of
that commerce which fell within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Justice BLAICHIORD declared Buzzard's Bay not to be a portion of the
high seas, and even if it was, that the regulation of fisheries is exercised
by the States, just as is the regulation of pilots, until Congress asserts its
will by some affirmative legislation.
Packer v. Bird et at. was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, January 19, 1891, on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. The case was a suit for the possession of an island of some size
in the Sacramento River, and by the assumption of Justice FIELD (who
wrote the opinion), above the ebb and flow of the tide, but in navigable
waters. The plaintiff deduced title to property on the west bank of the
river, from a patent issued by the United States, and describing the
eastern boundary of the tract to be on the margin of the river. From
this description, the plaintiff claimed title to the island as lying on his
side of the middle of the stream. Recognizing the common law rule of
ownership ad medium aquz filurn (see 27 AMRIcAN LAW R.EGISTER
796-9), the Court proceeded to point out anew the difference between
rivers in England and America, and to reaffirm the definition of public
navigable streams, declared by the same Justice in The Daniel Ball (1871),
io Wall. (77 U. S.) 557, 563 (see 29 A2IERIcAN LAW REGISTER 744), as
being such as "are used, orare susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are, or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."
This rule was first declared in The Genesee Chief(I85I), 12 How. (53 U.
S.) 443, 455, and is derived from the Roman law, "which took its rise in
a country where there was a tideless sea": READ, J., Bridge Co. v.
Kirk (1863), 46 Pa. 112, 12o. After alluding to the acceptance of the
Roman doctrine by most of the States, and citing the Pennsylvania case
just mentioned, as well as People v. Appiraisers (iS65), 33 N. Y. 461, 499,
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and Mnrcanus v. Carmichael (1856), 3 Iowa I, for their exhaustive considera-
tion of the different State court decisions, the court proceeded to accept the
view of the California Court, that the title of the plaintiff did not extend fur-
ther than the margin of a navigable stream. An error should be avoided: the
view of the California Court was not adopted because the case was an appro-
priate one for following the decisionof the State Court (ante, page 372) ; on the
contrary, the claim oftheplaintiffdepended upon the construction of a grant
made by the United States, and the State Court happened to take the view
already adopted by the United States Courts, as already mentioned.
U. S. ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, decided March 23, i891, by the Supreme
Court of the United States, resulted in the affirmance of a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, refusing a mandamus to compel
the Secretary of State to pay over certain moneys allowed to the petitioner on
account of a claim against the government of Mexico. This decision proceed-
ed upon the ground that the political department of the United States had not
yet parted with its power over this claim, by reason of certain charges of
fraudulent imposition practiced by the claimants, and therefore the writ could
not be allowed to coerce executive judgment or discretion. Following Fre-
lznghuysen v. Key (84), x1o U. S. 63, the special contention was denied that
the claimants had any final adjudicatiop in their favor arising from a find-
ing by an umpire under the convention of July 4, 1868 (15 Stat. at Large 679).
between Mexico and the United States. In other words, ChiefJustice FULLER
was careful to reassert the principles already declared by the Court in . S.
v. Windom (1891), 137 U. S. 636; U. S. v. Black (x888), 128 U. S. 40, 48, and
Taxing Dist. v. Loague (1889), 129 U. S. 493, 520; in substance, that a man-
damus confers no new authority, requires the person to be coerced to have the
power to do the act voluntarily, and therefore enforces no more than a bounden
duty not dependent upon executive discretion. Justice BRADLEY, considering
another phase of the question in U. S. v. Black, refused to interfere in the ex-
ercise of ordinary executive duties involving an interpretation of the law,
because the Court had no appellate power in such case, adding, that a refusal
to exercise executive discretion or to perform a ministerial duty must, how-
ever, be good ground for a mandamus. These sentiments were cited with
approval by Justice LANtAR in Redfield v. lVindom, after calling attention to
one other element of the relator's case, namely, want of other adequate
remedy. This subject was considered in an annotation to Bates v. Taylor,
Governor, in 28 AMERICAN LAw REGISTER 350, 354, within the narrow but
important lines of the power to issue the writ to a chief executive, though
briefly distinguishing cabinet officers from the President. The annoter con-
cluded that the Executive ought to be free from judicial control, as was the
decision ofthe Court in the case annoted. Since the publication of this anno-
tation, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has awarded a mandamus against
Governor Thayer and the other members of the State Board of Canvassers,
to compel the canvassing of the votes for a judge of the Sixth Judicial
District of that State : State v. 27tayer elal., January 2, 189!. The opposition
to the issuance of the writ, so far as general principles applied, was made in
behalf of the Governor alone, and only "in view of the public interest, and a
desire to have all questions raised by the proceedings passed upon," rather
than from a disposition to urge an objection. The Court examined High on
Extraordinary Legal Remedies . iiS, and Maxwell on Pleading and Practice
735, following the latter, quoting with approval these sentences: "There is a
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conflict in the authorities as to the right of a court to grant a mandamus against
the governor of a State, to compel the performance of a merely ministerial
duty. That the courts have jurisdiction in such cases, there seems to be no
doubt. In a free government, no officer is above the law, and should not be
permitted to disregard it with impunity. No good reason can be given why a
governor, whose duty it is to see that the laws are executed, should himself
be permitted to set them at defiance." There is, therefore, still a conflict
among the decisions of the different State Courts.
I
Davis v. State of Texas was decided April 13, i8gi, soon after the other two
murder cases from that State, one of which was printed (ante, page 359), and
three of the objections raised to the action of the State Courts were similar and
similarly decided to those in Duncan v. ArcCall; another to that in CaldwelIv.
Texas; the fifth and sixth objections that a continuance had been refused, were
also denied as presenting no Federal question, the Court speaking by Chief
Justice FULLER, once more declaring that " the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of
the United States were" restrictive of the powers of the Federal Government,
and not restraints upon the States. The seventh objection was, that the jury were
not instructed upon murder in the second degree, as required by 6o7 of the
Penal Code, but no federal right, title, privilege or immunity was claimed at
the trial; hence there was no Federal question, and it was not in the province
ofthe Supreme Court of the United States to pass upon any such question.
That is, there was due process of law, and the accused was compelled to abide,
in this respect, under the judgment of the State Courts. Callon v. People
(1889), 130 U. S. 83, was distinguished as a case "which came directly to us
from the Supreme Court of the Territory" of Utah, " and the inquiry related
to the commission of mere error, and statuary provisions like those of Texas
were not under consideration. A writ of error to review the judgment of the
highest tribunal of a State stands on far different ground, and cannot be main-
tained in the absence of of a Federal question, givingus jurisdiction." In this
latter case, the Territorial Court failed to charge the jury that they had the
right to recommend imprisonment at hard labor for the death penalty on con-
viction of murder in the first degree. So all of these Texas cases failed to
secure a reversal. The most singular part of the arguments advanced by the
appellants was that founded on one of the first twelve Amendments, as these
apply to the United Statas, and not to the several States; Presser v. Illinois
(i886), 116 U. S. 252, where the commander of the Chicago Lehr and Vehr
Verin had been arrested and punished for commanding a parade of that
organization in military array and armed with rifles, without a license from
the Governor, as required by the State Military Code, 5 and 6. These sec-
tions were held not to be in conflict with the Second Amendment, because
"This is one of the Amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the
powers of the National Government, leaving the people to look for their pro-
tection against any violation by their fellow citizens, of the rights it recognizes
to what.is called in New York v. Miln. (1837), 'i Pet. (36 U. S.) 139, the
' powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was perhaps
more properly called internal police,' not surrendered or restrained by the
Constitution of the United States." This language of Justice WooDs was
repeated in a briefer but emphatic form by Justice MILLER in Eilenbecker v.
District Court (189o), 134 U. S. 34, with reference to the Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Amendments. Chief Justice WAITE was equally brief in Ex fiarle
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Spies (1887), 123 U. S. 131, S. C. 27 AMiERICAN LAw REGISTER 23, with
regard to the Fourth, as well as to the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amend-
ments. The Fifth Amendment was supposed to have been transgressed in
these Texas cases.
Bo.k v. Perkins et al., decided April r3, 1891, by the Supreme Court of
the United States, declared not only that a suit against a marshal for seiz-
ing goods under an attachment could be removed to a Circuit Court of the
the United States, as a case arising under the laws of the United States, but
also, that in Iowa, an assignment for the benefit of creditors, embracing "all
the lands and all the personal property of every name and nature whatsoever
of the" assignor, "more particularly enumerated and described in the
schedule" annexed, and "made part of this assignment," did not pass the
title to the assignee of a stock of merchandise of which no mention was made
in the schedule. Consequently, an attachment could be subsequently issued
against the merchandise by a creditor of the assignor, and the marshal would
not be liable for making the seizure under the attachment. Justice HARLAN
said that "t
th
e general description in the first part of the general clause, must
be held to be limited by the words which immediately follow, indicating that
the property, real and personal, intended to be conveyed, was enumerated in
theschedule annexed," because the schedule was expressly made part of the
assignment. To this, objection was made that the words referring to the
schedule as particularly enumerating the property, were followed by these :
"or intended so to be." Justice HARLAN answered: "But this language
must be taken in connection with other parts of the instrument, showing that
the distribution proposed had reference only to the property particularly enu-
merated in the schedule," especially as the property was not inconsiderable,
but worth ten thousand dollars, and formed the bulk of his estate. "These
views are sustained by the weight of authority; and we are referred to no deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Iowa to the contrary ; ' citing Wilkes v. Ferris
(x8to), 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 335, 345 ; Driscoll v, Fiske (1839), 2X Pick. (Mass.) 503,
505,507; .Jforrit v. Armstrong (1869), 31 Md. 87; U. S. v. Langlton; (1829),
U. S. C- Ct. D. Mass., 5 Mason 2So, 288; Guerin v- Hunt (x86i), 6 Minn. 375;
lMlood v. Rowcliffe (i85i), 5 Eng Law and Eq. 471 ; ilc4lpine v. Foley (iS85),
34 Minn. 251 ; Rundlelt v. Dole (839), io N. H. 4 5 S; Belding v. Frankland
(88r), 8 Lea (Tenn.) 67; Scott v. Coleman (0824), 5 Litt. (Ky.) 349; Burrill,
Assignments (5 th ed.), 192-8. Justice HARLAN added that " Numerous
authorities are cited for the plaintiff, which are supposed to announce a con-
trary doctrine. Most of them, however, will be found, upon careful examina-
tion, to proceed upon the peculiar wording of the instruments construed.
Among these cases is Banykv. .,,n (i855), 17 How. (58 U. S.) 157, 159, x6o;"
National Bank v. Bank of Commerce (x88o), 94 Ill. 271, 2'9 ; Plait v. Lott
(1858), 17 N. Y. 478; Turner v. Jarcox (iS6 9 ), 40 N. Y. 470; Holmes v. ffub-
bard (1875), 6o N. Y. 183, iS5; Bank v. Roche (1883), 93 N. Y. 374, 378.
ln re Caasen, r40 U. S. 200, was the first case in which involved the con-
struction of the Act of March 3, i89t establishing Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The defendant was indited under Section 5,209 Rev. Stats. in the Southern
District of New York, and on the 27th of May, i89o, convicted. On March 3,
189i, Congress passed an Act, entitled "All Act to establish Circuit Courts of
Appeals, and to define and regulate in certain cases the jurisdiction of the
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Courts of the United States and for other purposes." The fifth section of that
Act provides that a writ of error may be taken from an existing Ci cuit Court
direct to the Supreme Court of the United States, in the following cases among
others, " in cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime."
On the x8th of March, 18gi, the defendant was sentenced by th2 Circuit Court
to be imprisoned for a term of six years in the Erie County Penitentiary. On
the 21st of March, x891, a writ of error to the Circuit from the Supreme Court
was allowed by one of the Associate Justices, and a citation signed, returnable
on the second Monday of April, 1891, with the following direction: "This
writ is to operate as a supercedeas and stay of execution, with leave to the United
States to move the Supreme Court of the United States on notice to vacate
the stay, as having been granted without authority of law." A motion toset aside
the sufiercedeas was denied. Before the Act of March 3 d, and at the time of
the trial, there was no appeal to the Supreme Court in such cases. Of course,
a bill of exceptions was not provided for, either by statute or by rule, and,
therefore, though the Court granted the writ because the final judgment on the
conviction was rendered subsequently to March 3, 189I, they refused the peti-
tion of the defendant for a writ of mandamus to compel the Judge who pre-
sided at the trial to seal a hill of exceptions which could not have been had at
the time of the conviction. The result was a writ which acted as a supfercedeas
without a bill of exceptions.
A good illustration of the truth of the saying "that no question in a
Habeas Corfius case can be considered settled," is shown in the appeal of one
Wood to the Supreme Court (lt re WVood, decided May I, 1891, 140 U. S. 27 8.
Concerning opinion of Judge FIELD, P. 370). This case raised the question
whether, when the laws of the State did not prohibit colored persons from
serving on juries, or make a distinction on account of color, whether a colored
person indicted in the State Courts could have a right to remove his case to the
Federal Courts, on the ground that the practice of the State officers was to
exclude persons of color from the juries. The Court held, as ithad held when
exactly the same question was raised in Nleal v. Delaware, X03 U. S., 370, 405,
409, that when the statutes of a State do not exclude persons of African descent
from serving as grand or petty jurors, a person accused in a State Court of
crime, who desires to avail himself of the fact that they were so excluded in the
selection of the grand jury which found the indictment against him, or of the
jury which tried him, should make the objection in the State Court dur-
ing the trial, and, if overruled, should take the question for decision to the
highest Courts to which a writ of error could be sued out from this Court.
Failing to do this he cannot have the decision of the State Court reversed
by a Circuit Court of the United States upon a writ of Habeas Corpius.
It is exactly eleven years since this question was decided, in eleven years more
we may expect to have it decided again. The fact that in Habeas Corpus
proceedings nothing is finally determined, finds its best illustration in the
number of times which the Supreme Court had decided that the first six
Amendments to the Constitution are restrictions on the Federal Government
and not on the States.
In the case of Leny v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, the Supreme Court of the
United States took another step in the elucidation of the question, what is
"due process of law" in taking property. After deciding, in accord-
ance with previous decisions (see Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97;
